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Comments
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES. CONCERNING WITNESS
IMMUNITY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
1. INTRODUCiTION

Despite the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,'
an individual may be compelled to testify when provided with immunity
from the use in any subsequent prosecution of the compelled testimony or its fruits.2

Grants of immunity may result from the opera-

tion of a statute 3 or from agreements between the: prosecutor and
the prospective witness.4 The ability of the: government to compel

I. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall be . . . compelled in a criminal case to be a witness
against himself .......
Id. For an analysis of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2250-2284 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
2. See Kastigar v. United States,
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
testimony of witnesses who claim the
incrimination. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005

406 U.S. 441 (1972). Title II of the
authorizes district courts to compel the
fifth amendment privilege against self(1976). Title II prohibits use of com-

pelled testimony in any subsequent prosecution of the witness.

Id. § 6002.

According to Kastigar, this prohibition gives rise to an affirmative duty on the
part of the government to prove that evidence used in a subsequent prosecution
of the witness is derived from completely independent sources. 406 U.S. at 460.
For a discussion of Kastigar and the Supreme Court's position prior to that
decision, see notes 42-51 infra.
3. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976). For the text of § 6002, the general
immunity provision, see -note 44 infra. Title II superseded over fifty separate
federal immunity statutes. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 447
(1972). The constitutionality of Title II was upheld in Kastigar. See id. at
453. Through immunity statutes, the state and federal legislatures accommodate the government's need for information with the individual's privilege
against compelled self-incrimination. See id. at 443-47; Comment, The Federal
Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional
Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1571-74 (1963).

4. See United States v. Quatermain, 613 F.2d 38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 2946 (1980). The dissent in Quatermain characterizes the use of informal
immunity agreements, also known as "letter" immunity and "hip-pocket" immunity, as widespread. See id. at 45 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Prosecutorial

grants of informal immunity are a product of the broad discretion vested in
prosecutors and are more precisely described as agreements not to prosecute.
Id. For a discussion of informal immunity, see notes 94-111 and accompanying
text infra. For critical analysis of the breadth of prosecutorial discretion, see
Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521
(1981).

(123)
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incriminating testimony has been recognized almost since the origin of
the privilege against self-incrimination 5 and is seen as necessary to the
administration of criminal justice.6
This comment will explore current problems in the judicial treatment of cases involving grants of immunity from prosecution, focusing
first on the minimum standards of constitutionality in immunity
grants, 7 next on the analysis of a witness's claim of unlawful derivative
use,8 and finally, on the nature of informally negotiated witness immunity agreements. 9 The controversy presented by United States v.
Quatermain10 will be offered as a basis for discussion of these issues.
This comment will also examine an aspect of witness immunity which
is currently a subject of controversy in the federal courts of appealsthe right, if any, of a defendant to obtain immunization of defense
witnesses who would otherwise refuse to testify." The discussion of
defense witness immunity will focus on conflicting case law from the
12
United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits.
5. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972); L. LEVY,
ORIGINS OF THE Fi-ii AMENDMENT 495 n.43 (1968). Professor Levy observes
that while the privilege against self-incrimination was firmly established in
England by 1680, "its rationales changed from time to time as its meaning and
application expanded." Id. In England, an immunity statute was enacted in
1710. See 9 Anne, c. 14, §§3-4 (1710), cited in Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 445 n.13 (1972). Colonial Pennsylvania and New York enacted immunity statutes in the 18th century. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441, 445 n.13 (1972).
6. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The Kastigar Court
maintained that the immunity statutes
seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege
and the legitimate demands of government to compel citizens to testify.
The existence of these statutes reflects the importance of testimony,
and the fact that many offenses are of such a character that the only
persons capable of giving useful testimony are those implicated in
the crime.
Id. at 446.
Note that the accused's right to confront witnesses against him implies a
general government power of compulsory process. Id. at 443. The fifth amendinent is seen as an exception to that power. Id. at 444.
7. See notes 13-55 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 56-93 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 94-113 and accompanying text infra.
10. 613 F.2d 38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2946 (1980).
11. See notes 114-63 infra.
12. See, e.g., United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting the existence of a defendant's constitutional right to immunization of defense witnesses); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979) (recognizing constitutional bases for judicial immunization of defense witnesses). Turkish and Herman are discussed in Part
IV of this comment.
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II.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS IMMUNrrY LAW

The fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination 18 is an exception to the general rule that the government can
compel testimony. 14 Where the testimony sought could not possibly be
the basis of, or an aid to, a subsequent prosecution of the witness, the
5
privilege will not sanction a witness's silence 1 -that is, when the pos6
sibility of incrimination is taken away, the privilege ceases to apply.'
The gravamen of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
is that the government may not use compulsion to elicit self-incriminating statements,"7 and that the government may not use compelled, self8
By focusing on this secincriminating statements in a criminal case.'
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. See note I supra.
14. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38 (1807) (No. 14,693). The Court
in Burr observed: "It is a settled maxim of law that no man is bound to
criminate himself. This maxim forms one exception to the general rule, which
declares that every person is compellable to bear testimony in a court of
justice." Id. at 39. For a discussion of the history of the basic duty of the
citizenry to testify in the courts, see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
443-47 (1972). For the history of the privilege against self-incrimination, see
L. LEVY, supra note 5. See generally Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict
Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Government's Need
for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 103.
15. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). The Hale Court observed that
the "interdiction of the Fifth Amendment operates only where a witness is asked
to incriminate himself-in other words, to give testimony which may possibly
expose him to a criminal charge." Id. at 67. The witness asserting his fifth
amendment privilege must make some showing of the propriety of the assertion.
In re Grand Jury Empanelled, Feb. 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1979) (witness
found obligated to comply with subpoena duces tecum absent some showing
that production of documents or acknowledgment of their possession would be
an incriminating admission). Where a witness has been immunized or otherwise found not entitled to assert the privilege against self-incrimination, continued refusal to testify will result in civil and/or criminal contempt sanctions.
In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir.
1976. See also Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971) (contempt sanction
for refusal to testify is proper when witness is immune but improper. when
immunity is constitutionally inadequate).
16. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). Note that while the fifth
amendment protects only compulsory self-incrimination, the first amendment
may otherwise support a witness's silence. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957) (compulsion of testimony revealing acts or associations which expose
witness to public scorn unconstitutionally chills witness's first amendment
rights).
17. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (object of privilege
against self-incrimination is to insure that an individual acting as a witness will
not be compelled to incriminate himself). See also Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391 (1976) (fifth amendment prohibits physical or moral compulsion by
the government); Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971) (fifth amendment
prohibits not prosecution or conviction, but compulsion).
18. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). The object of the provision
against self-incrimination is to protect the witness against prosecution Id. at 595.
The privilege against self-incrimination is not a right to absolute silence; it
must be balanced against societal interest in the administration of criminal
justice. Id. at 596.
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ond, more functional aspect a9-that the privilege protects a witness
from uses of the statement-courts have found a basis for upholding immunity statutes. 20 The United States Supreme Court has noted that the
constitutionality of an immunity statute is a function of the scope of pro21
tection provided to the witness by the statute.
Generally, immunity statutes have provided either transactional, 22
mere use, or derivative use immunity.2 3 Transactional immunity is
19. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). The Brown Court viewed
the self-incrimination clause as designed to "effect a practical and beneficent

purpose." Id. at 596. But see United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38 (1807) (No.
14,693) (courts can never compel a witness to disclose a fact tending to incriminate him). Note that .justice Marshall's broad reading of the privilege
against self-incrimination in Burr followed the prosecutor's observation that
"[t]he doctrine is most pernicious and contrary to the public good." Id. at 39.
20. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). Brown was the first case to
hold an immunity statute constitutional. Id. at 610. The statute in question
afforded absolute immunity from prosecution relating to any transaction,
matter, or occurrence about which the witness testified. See Act of Feb. 11,
1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443. The Act of 1893 was passed by Congress in order
to meet the requisites for constitutionality announced by the Supreme Court in
Counselman v Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.

43 (1906). The Counselman Court held that immunity statutes used to compel

testimony must provide absolute immunity against future prosecution in order
to withstand a constitutional challenge. 142 U.S. at 586.
21. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); note 20 supra. The
Court stated: "In view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment,
to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the
offense to which the question relates." 142 U.S. at 585. The Court also maintained: "Legislation cannot detract from the privilege afforded by the Consti,
tution . . . a mere act of Congress cannot amend the Constitution, even if it
should engraft thereon such a proviso." Id. at 564-65. More recently, the
Court clarified the constitutional standard. See Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441 (1972). The Kastigar Court stated that "a grant of immunity cannot
supplant the privilege, and is not sufficient to compel testimony over a claim
of the privilege unless the scope of the grant of immunity is coextensive with
the scope of the privilege." Id. at 450.
Where an immunity statute does not require that the witness claim the
constitutional privilege before receiving immunity, the protection of statutory
immunity has been held to be automatic. See United States v. Monia, 317
U.S. 424 (1943). The general federal immunity statute currently in force has
not been held to confer automatic immunity, and the witness's extant or
prospective refusal to testify is essential. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976). For a
discussion of the current general federal immunity statute, see notes 42-44 and
accompanying text infra. Though the witness's refusal to testify is significant
under § 6002, a witness who testifies against interest without immunity or with
inadequate immunity will not be presumed to have waived his constitutional
privilege. See United States v. Moss, 562 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 914 (1978), citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The privilege against self-incrimination can be intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily
waived. In re Investigation Before April 1975 Grand Jury, 403 F. Supp. 1176
(D.D.C. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
22. See Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443. The Act provides that
"no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or
on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may

testify." Id.
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976). For the relevant text of § 6002, see note
44 infra. Note that mere, or simple, use immunity differs from derivative use
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broad; it prohibits a subsequent prosecution of the immune witness
which is based upon a transaction, matter, or occurrence about which he
testified or produced evidence.24 Mere use and derivative use immunity
are less comprehensive; they protect the immune witness from use of
his compelled testimony as evidence in a subsequent prosecution. 25
Transactional immunity prevents prosecution; derivative and mere use
immunity prevent use of the testimony.2 6
At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Counselman v.
Hitchcock,2 7 it was generally accepted that transactional immunity was
the constitutional minimum. 28 Only transactional immunity was conimmunity in that mere use immunity prohibits only the direct introduction of
the witness's testimony in evidence against him in a subsequent prosecution.
See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). For a recent case involving
mere use immunity, see United States v. Dornau, 491 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1974)
(a statute providing mere use immunity cannot be used to compel testimony
but may serve as the basis for an agreement to testify).
24. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). The Brown Court stated:
It is not that he shall not be prosecuted for or on account of any
crime concerning which he may testify, . . . but the immunity extends
to any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may testify,
which clearly indicates that the immunity is intended to be general,
and to be applicable whenever and in whatever court such prosecution be had.
Id. at 608 (emphasis in original).
25. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Derivative use immunity "prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to
the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness." Id. at 453 (emphasis in
original). For a discussion of judicial constructions of derivative use, see notes
52-55 and accompanying text infra. A witness possessed of derivative use
immunity is subject to subsequent prosecution relating to the contents of
his testimony if the government shows that the subsequent prosecution is in no
way a result of the government's use of his testimony. See Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
Mere use immunity prevents direct use of the immunized testimony but
does not protect the witness from "future prosecution based on knowledge and
sources of information obtained from the compelled testimony." Ullmann v.
United States, 350 U.S. 422, 437 (1956). Mere use immunity is constitutionally
inadequate to compel testimony. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892).

26. See notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra. Transactional immunity
has been found to presuppose derivative use immunity. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (state transactional immunity makes derivative use of compelled testimony by the federal government a violation of the
witness's privilege against self-incrimination). Note that derivative use immunity tends, in practice, to result in transactional immunity. This is because
the government's heavy burden in a subsequent prosecution to disprove derivative use of the immunized testimony frequently functions to protect the witness
from prosecution relating to any matter about which he testifies. For a discussion of the government's burden to disprove derivative use, see notes 48-49
and accompanying text infra.
27. 142 -U.S. 547 (1892)..
28. See Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, § 2, 11 Stat. 155. The first federal
immunity statute provided broad transactional immunity. See id.; cf. Immunity
Act of 1868, ch. 13, § 1, 15 Stat. 37 (mere use immunity statute).
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sidered broad enough to encompass the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination. 29 In Counselman, a unanimous Court struck down
a federal statute which provided mere use immunity,30 largely because
it did not prohibit derivative use, 3 1 but the Court did observe elsewhere in its opinion that only transactional immunity could override a
witness's assertion of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.32 Four years later, in Brown v. Walker, a divided Court upheld
the constitutionality of a federal statute which provided that self-incriminating testimony could be compelled under a grant of transactional
immunity.83
A spate of confusion followed Brown, beginning with Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission 34 and concluding with Kastigar v. United
29. See State v. Nowell, 58 N.H. 314 (1878).

The Nowell court stated:

The legislature, having undertaken to obtain the testimony of the witness without depriving him of his constitutional privilege of protec-

tion, must relieve him from all liabilities on account of the matters
which he is compelled to disclose; otherwise, the statute would be ineffectual. He is to be secured against all liability to future prosecution
as effectually as if he were wholly innocent.
Id. at 315.
30. See 142 U.S. at 586.

Counselman was called to testify before the grand

jury and asserted his privilege against self-incrimination despite the protection
of statutory use immunity and was found in contempt of court. Id. at 552.
It was the government's position that the privilege could be invoked only
where the witness was on trial himself in a criminal case, and thus could not
be invoked before the grand jury. Id. at 553-54.
agreed, stating: "The privilege is limited to criminal
as the mischief against which it seeks to guard. . .
being a witness against himself is to be exercised
grand jury." Id. at 562-63.

The Supreme Court dismatters, but it is as broad
. [T]he privilege of not
in a proceeding before a

31. See id. at 564, 586. After finding that Counselman had properly invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, the Court found that the statu-

tory use immunity provided was inadequate. Id. The Court noted specifically

that the statute did not prevent the use of the testimony "which consists in.
gaining therefrom a knowledge of the details of a crime, and of sources of information which may supply other means of convicting the witness or party."
Id. at 586.
32. Id. at 586.

The Counselman Court stated: "In view of the constitu-

tional provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute im-

munity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates."
Id. The language in Counselman amounts to a requirement that both transactional and derivative use immunity be provided by immunity statutes in order
that they comport with the strictures of the fifth amendment. Id.
33. 161 U.S. 591 (1896). The petitioner in Brown was adjudged in contempt of court after he asserted the privilege against self-incrimination and
refused to testify under statutory immunity. Id. at 592-93. The Court observed

that the fifth amendment prohibition against compelled self-incrimination

could be interpreted to prohibit compulsion of testimony or to prohibit prosecution after the compulsion of testimony. Id. at 595. Adopting the latter
interpretation, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a transactional immunity statute. Id. at 596, 610.

34. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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States8 5 ' In Murphy, the Court held that the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination prohibits the derivative use of state immunized
testimony in a subsequent federal prosecution of the witness.36 Recognizing that a state immunity statute could not bind the federal government, 7 the Murphy Court construed the fifth amendment itself as an
exclusionary rule 38 prohibiting federal use of state-immunized testirm6ny.39 The Murphy Court's proscription of federal derivative use of
state immunized testimony was taken as an indication that the Supreme
Court's position had shifted 40 and that the Court would find constitutional a statute providing derivative use, rather than full transactional,
immunity.41
35. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
36. 378 U.S. at 79. The Court held "the constitutional rule to be that a
state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot
be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him." Id. In so holding, the Court found state transactional
immunity statutes to imply federal derivative use immunity. Id.
37. See 378 U.S. at 71. On the same day Murphy was decided, the Court
held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is fully
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
38. 378 U.S. at 79. The Court relied on Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179
(1954). The Adams Court had observed that "a witness does not need any
statute to protect him from the use of self-incriminating testimony he is compelled to give over his objection. The Fifth Amendment takes care of that
without a statute." Id. at 181.
39. 378 U.S. at 75. The Court's broad holding was that "the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination
under federal as well as state law and a federal witness against incrimination
under state as well as federal law." Id. at 77-78.
40. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4089. Note that Murphy did not extplicitly
overrule Counselman or Brown, cases which had indicated that transactional
immunity was the constitutional minimum. See 378 U.S. at 75. See also
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 463 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice
Douglas opined: "Murphy overruled not Counselman, but Feldman v. United
States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944), which held 'that one jurisdiction within our federal
structure may compel a witness to give testimony which could be used to convict him of a crime in another jurisdiction.''" See 406 U.S. at 463, quoting
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 387 U.S. at 77.
41. For a discussion of Congress's apparent impression of Murphy as establishing derivative use immunity as the constitutional minimum, see note 43
infra; see also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 458. In discussing Murphy,
the Kastigar Court stated that "the reasoning of the Court in Murphy and the
result reached compel the conclusion that use and derivative-use immunity is
constitutionally sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege." Id.
Note that Justice Douglas, dissenting in Kastigar, described the problem confronting the Murphy Court as one of federalism. See id. at 464 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). According to Justice Douglas, the issue before the Murphy Court
was simply the constitutionality of restrictions on state or federal prosecutorial

power resulting from interjurisdictional effects of immunity grants.

Id. at

463-64.
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Eight years after Murphy, in Kastigar, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Title II of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
(Title II).42 Title II is a general federal immunity statute currently
used to provide use and derivative use immunity to witnesses in pro.
ceedings before or ancillary to grand juries, courts, or agencies of the
United States, or before either House of Congress. 43 According to section 6002 of Title II, a witness may not assert the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination once the person presiding over the proceeding communicates an order compelling his testimony. 44 The Kastigar Court agreed with the petitioner's argument that in order to supplant
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination an immunity
42. 406 U.S. at 462. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976). For the text of
§ 6002 of Title II, see note 44 infra.
43. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976). The general federal immunity statute
previously in effect afforded full transactional immunity. See Compulsory
Testimony Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 443, repealed by Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, Title II, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976). For a discussion of transactional immunity, as opposed to use and derivative use immunity, see notes
22-26 and accompanying text supra. The legislative adoption of use and derivative use immunity in Title II may have been "premised on the views of
some attorneys and legal scholars that Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892) (which set the requirement at absolute immunity) has been overruled
by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52." H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4089
(other citations omitted). For a discussion of Murphy, see notes 34-41 and accompanying text supra.
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976). Section 6002 provides in pertinent part:
[T]he witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be
used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with

the order.
Id. In court and grand jury proceedings, immunity orders are issued by the
United States district court for the judicial district in which the proceedings

take place, upon request of the district's United States attorney. See id. § 6003.

For the procedures employed in issuing immunity orders in administrative and
congressional proceedings, see id. §§ 6003-6004. The United States attorney,
before seeking a court order, must be satisfied that the testimony is needed in
the public interest and that the witness has refused or will refuse to testify.
See id.§ 6003. Title II delegates to the United States attorney authority to
balance the public interests. See id.; In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). In addition, a United States attorney seeking an
immunity order must obtain the approval of the Attorney General or his
designee. See 18 U.S.C. § 6003(b) (1976). Acting or assistant United States

attorneys and acting or assistant Attorneys General have authority pursuant to
§ 6003. See Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Yanagita, 552 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1977). The court's duties in granting the
immunity order are ministerial; when an order is properly requested, a judge
has no discretion to deny it. See United States v. Hollinger, 553 F.2d 535 (7th
Cir. 1977). Nor can the court provide immunity sua sponte. United States v.
Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1978). The court's role is merely to find
the facts alleged to substantiate the need to compel the witness's testimony.
See Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d at 540. There is no need for an adversary

hearing in order for a court to issue an immunity order. Id.
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statute must be coextensive with the scope of the privilege.45
to the Court, however, transactional immunity affords

According
protection

broader than that of the privilege itself, 46 and the Court held the use

and derivative use immunity provided by Title II constitutionally
47
sufficient.
The Kastigar Court's satisfaction with the derivative use immunity
of Title II is inextricably linked to the heavy burden the Court imposed
on the government to prove an independent source of evidence in a
subsequent prosecution of an immune witness.48 This burden amounts
to an affirmative duty on the prosecution to prove a legitimate source
of evidence wholly independent of compelled testimony when an immunized witness is subsequently prosecuted.4 9 To date, the Supreme
45. 406 U.S. at 453. The petitioners in Kastigar appealed from a contempt
order issued when they refused to testify before a federal grand jury despite
§ 6002 immunity. Id. at 442.
46. Id. at 453. The Kastigar Court stated: "Transactional immunity,
which affords full immunity from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader protection
than does the Fifth Amendment privilege. The privilege has never been construed to mean that one who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted."
Id. The Court further noted that the Supreme Court had never held that
transactional immunity was constitutional and that derivative use immunity
was not. Id. at 457. But cf. Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971)
(certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Writing the dissent in Piccirillo, Justice Brennan stated: "[T]his Court's decisions in the course of the past century have consistently read the Constitution
as requiring no more, but no less, than transactional immunity." Id. at 563
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The Piccirillodissenters, in discussing whether mere
use immunity was sufficient to compel testimony before a state grand jury,
observed that the fifth amendment requires a grant of absolute immunity from
prosecution for any transaction revealed in compelled testimony. Id. at 562
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Citing Murphy, Justice Brennan noted that transactional immunity presupposes use immunity. Id. at 562 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Piccirillo dissenters also maintained that immunity "which
protects the individual only against the actual use of his compelled testimony
and its fruits, satisfies neither the language of the Constitution itself nor the
values, purposes, and policies that the privilege was historically designed to
serve and that it must serve in a free country." Id. at 563 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. 406 U.S. at 453. The Kastigar Court ruled "that such immunity from
use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against
self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim
of the privilege." Id.
48. Id. at 460-61, The Kastigar Court did not elaborate on the meaning
of "heavy burden." Id. The prosecution is charged with proving that "all"
of its evidence is derived from "legitimate independent sources." Id. at 461-62.
The Court elsewhere in its opinion indicated that compelled testimony can not
be used to commence an investigation of the witness, or to focus an investigation on the witness. Id. at 460. Since Kastigar, the government's heavy burden
has been judged according to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. See
United States v. Henderson, 406 F. Supp. 417 (D. Del. 1975). The government's burden has also been judged according to the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard. See United States v. Seiffert, 501 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1974).
• 49. 406 U.S. at 460. The Court's interpretation of § 6002 as implying this
heavy burden draws support from Murphy. See 378 U.S. at 79 n.18. The
Mur'phy Court stated: "Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified,
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Court has not departed from its position in Kastigar; 50 currently, derivative use immunity is the minimal protection necessary to constitutionally compel testimony. 51
In the lower courts, derivative use is often described as the direct
or indirect use of the fruits of compelled testimony.5 2 Even non-evidentiary 58 derivative use has generally been found to be proscribed by
section 6002. 5 4 Thus, where information revealed in compelled testiunder a state grant of immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution,
the federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence is not
tainted by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate source for the
disputed evidence." Id.
The Kastigar Court analogized the relatively lighter burden imposed on
the government when the use of an allegedly coerced confession, rather than
compelled testimony, is claimed to violate an individual's privilege against self-

incrimination. See 406 U.S. at 461.

In the former instance, a voluntariness

hearing precedes, and can obviate, the government's need to prove a wholly
independent source. See id. at 462, citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(1964) (due process demands a hearing on the issue of voluntariness when a

defendant objects to the admission in evidence of a confession). Where a
defendant asserts that improper use of his compelled testimony has been made,
he need only show that he testified under a grant of immunity, and the government must prove a wholly independent source for all its evidence.

See 406

U.S. at 461-62. Voluntariness is not relevant where the alleged use of compelled testimony is at issue. Id.
50. See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980) (in a prosecution

for perjury, truthful portions of immunized testimony, as well as false portions,
are admissible against the witness; Kastigar upheld in dictum).
51. See 406 U.S. at 462. Note that while mere use immunity cannot be
used to compel testimony, it may serve as the basis for an agreement to testify.
United States v. Dornau, 491 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1974).
52. See, e.g., In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973) (derivative use immunity prohibits use of compelled testimony and its fruits in any connection
with a criminal prosecution of the witness); In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32 (7th
Cir.), rev'd on, other grounds, 406 U.S. 952 (1972) (Title II requires suppression
of compelled testimony and its fruits in criminal proceedings).

53. Non-evidentiary use is use which does not directly or indirectly produce
evidence. See Sugar, Witness Immunity Act, 14 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 275, 285
(1976). It has been observed that "[s]uch use could conceivably include assistance in focusing the investigation, deciding to initiate prosecution, refusing to
plea-bargain, interpreting evidence, planning cross-examination, and otherwise
generally planning trial strategy." United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305
(8th Cir. 1973).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Anzalone, 555 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1977) (where
the same grand jury that heard a witness's immunized testimony subsequently
indicts the witness, the immunized testimony must be deemed to have been
used, despite a lapse in time between the testimony and the indictment);
United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1976) (testimony of witness
against whom defendant previously testified under a grant of immunity may
be derivative use of defendant's immunized testimony; witness's subjective
motivation to testify is relevant on the issue of derivative use); United States
v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973) (where prosecutor accidentally read
transcripts of defendant's immunized testimony prior to indictment of defendant, impermissible use was made of the testimony despite the fact that such
use did not result in the presentation of any specific evidence at trial); United
States v. Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds,
491 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1974) (trial prosecutor's exposure to defendant's im-
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mony inspires a prosecutor to begin or continue prosecution, or where it
motivates an individual to testify against an immune witness, courts
have found an impermissible derivative use. 5
III.

UNITED STATES V. QUATERMAIN-A

CASE IN POINT

Illustrative of some of the more troublesome problems encountered
in witness immunity cases is United States v. Quatermain.5 0 In 1977,
the defendant Quartermain testified under a grant of immunity in aid
of a federal prosecution of one Fairorth for the illegal manufacture of
methamphetamine.5 7 Fairorth was convicted and, while on bond pending appeal, became a government informant against Quatermain. 68
Information supplied to the government by Fairorth led to the indictment of Quatermain for the illegal manufacture of a silencer. 59 Quatermunized testimony before trial creates an almost irrebuttable presumption of
some use). See generally Note, Standards for Exclusion in Immunity Cases
After Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 YALE L.J. 171 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1971
Term, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 181 (1972).
55. See cases cited in note 54 supra. Note that because questions of nonevidentiary use call into issue the subjective reaction of the prosecutor to the
testimony, the government's already heavy, affirmative burden to disprove derivative use is almost impossible to sustain. See United States v. Kurzer, 534
F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1974).
56. 613 F.2d 38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2946 (1980).
57. Id. at 39. Quatermain agreed to assist the government in its investigation of Fairorth and received an informal immunity agreement. Id. The
district court treated the informal immunity grant as derivative-use immunity
largely because Quatermain accepted the immunity without the advice of
counsel and did not appear to have knowingly and intelligently waived his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 467 F. Supp. 782, 788 (E.D.
Pa. 1979). The Third Circuit assumed, without deciding, the correctness of
requiring minimum constitutional immunity in an informal immunity agreement. 618 F.2d at 41. For a discussion of the applicability of § 6002 to informal immunity agreements, see notes 94-113 and accompanying text infra.
58. 613 F.2d at 39.
59. Id. In the course of his conduct as an informant, Fairorth was supplied with government funds to buy materials needed to make a sile'ncer;
Fairorth then sold them to Quatermain. Id. The government conceded that
Quatermain's testimony motivated Fairorth's activities as an informant, but
claimed that Quatermain was only immune from prosecution for the manufacture of methamphetamine. Id. at 40. Quatermain had, by a letter agreement, received "immunity from prosecution" for his involvement with Fairorth
"relating to the manufacture ofmethamphetamine." Id. at 39, quoting the
United States attorney's letter to Quatermain. For the text of this letter, see
613 F.2d at 44 n.1 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The government characterized
the immunity given Quatermain as an amalgam of transactional and derivative
use immunity. Id. at 40. The letter itself specifies neither transactional nor
derivative-use immunity. 467 F. Supp. 782, 789 (E.D. Pa. 1979). In its memorandum of law, and at oral argument, the government described the immunity
as derivative-use. Id. But the government at all times insisted that Quatermain's immunity was limited to immunity from prosecution for the manufacture of methamphetamine. Id. The scope of the immunity granted to Quatermain was found by the district court to be derivative-use immunity. See id.
at 788. The Third Circuit found that Quatermain possessed minimal constitu-
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main claimed that because his own testimony against Fairorth motiviited Fairorth to inform against Quatermain, unlawful derivative use
was made of his immunized testimony. 60 The Third Circuit's opinion
in Quatermain touches upon three problematic areas of witness immunity
1)minimal constitutional immunity; 2) the analysis of a
witness's law:
claim of unlawful derivative use, and 3) the nature
of informal
0
.immunity. '
A. Minimal ConstitutionalImmunity
The Third Circuit's opinion in Quatermain appears to rely on
Kastigar as authority for the proposition that derivative use immunity
may exceed the minimum immunity required by the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. 62 It is suggested, however, that an
examination of the language of Kastigar and the holding in Murphy
tional immunity. 613 F.2d at 41. It is submitted that minimal constitutional
immunity is derivative use immunity. See notes 69-73 and accompanying text
infra.

60. 613 F.2d at 40. Quatermain filed a motion to dismiss the indictment,
which the lower court treated as a motion to exclude Fairorth's testimony and

evidence derived therefrom.

Id. The motion to exclude Fairorth's testimony

and its fruits was sustained. Id. On the government's admission that all the
evidence presented to the grand jury to secure the indictment of Quatermain

was linked to Fairorth, the lower court dismissed the indictment. 467 F. Supp.
782, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1979). For a discussion of cases dealing with motivation as
derivative use, see notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's exclusion of Fairorth's testimony. 613 F.2d at 43.
61. Note that Quatermain has simply been chosen as a case in point; it is
presented here to function as a hypothetical case or a vehicle for discussion.
The analysis that commences here is not aimed at the Quatermain case as a
whole. The court's theories and reasoning relating to: 1) minimal constitutional
immunity; 2) the analysis of claimed unlawful derivative use, and 3) the nature
of informal immunity will be discussed separately, and no attempt will be made
to reconcile any inconsistencies in the Quatermain court's position on these
three issues.
62. 613 F.2d at 41. At the outset, it is submitted that the Third Circuit's
analysis in Quatermain is seriously flawed. The court did not decide whether
the testimony at issue was compelled or voluntary. Id. Nor did the court

decide the precise source of the defendant's immunity.

While the court

sporadically referred to the agreement not to prosecute, its terms were not discussed. Id. at 41, 43. Cases construing § 6002 were relied on throughout the
opinion. See id. at 41-43. The court assumed, without deciding, that the
agreement conferred the minimum immunity required by the Constitution.
Id. at 41. The Quatermain court's suggestion that such immunity may be less

than derivative-use immunity can be found in the following language:
We are not presented in this case with the question whether a
grant of use and derivative-use immunity can afford a witness protection against self-incrimination that is broader than the protection
provided by the constitutional privilege because here the district court
construed the parties' agreement to confer the minimum immunity required by the Constitution.
Id. It is submitted that implicit in this language is the proposition that derivative use immunity is more than what the Constitution requires.
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disproves the notion that anything less than derivative use immunity
is constitutionally sufficient.
. The Court in Kastigar held that immunity from use and derivative
use is "coextensive" with the scope of the fifth amendment privilege
It is submitted that the Kastigar Court's
against self-incrimination.6
holding fixes derivative use immunity as the constitutional minimum
because "coextensive" means "equal." 64 Furthermore, Kastigar represents a conceptual departure from a long line of cases requiring a
grant of absolute, or transactional, immunity in order to compel selfincriminating testimony.6
Because the Kastigar Court reduced the
minimum constitutional immunity standards, most of the Court's reasoning compares the newly adopted standard to the broader, transactional immunity previously required. 66 Thus, the Court's finding that
63. See 406 U.S. at 453, 462.
64. See THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DIUYIONARY vol. 1,
at 589 (1971). "Coextensive" is defined as "[e]xtending over the same space or
time; of equal extension; coinciding in limits . . . (b) Logic. Having the same
logical extension . . . 'Recprocating, Convertible or Coextensive Concepts are
those which have precisely the same Extension."'" Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
65. See Mykkeltvedt, To Supplant the Fifth Amendment's Right Against
Compulsory Self-Incrimination: The Supreme Court and Federal Grants of
Witness Immunity, 30 MERcER L. REV. 633 (1979). Mykkeltvedt notes that the
dissenting Justices in Kastigar and
constitutional scholars sucl as Professors David Fellman and Leonard
Levy, among others, have assailed Justice Powell's opinion for the
Court in Kastigar as a sharp departure from a well-established body
of case law holding that nothing less than transactional immunity
suffices to supplant the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled testimony.
Id. at 634.
66. See 406 U.S. at 449-58. Justice Powell, writing for the majority in
Kastigar, noted that the Court had not previously directly addressed the issue
of the constitutional sufficiency of derivative use immunity, largely because
prior statutes had provided comprehensive transactional immunity or constitutionally inadequate mere use immunity. Id. at 458. The Kastigar Court found
transactional immunity to be broader than the Constitution requires. Id. at
453. See Mykkeltvedt, supra note 65, at 650. Mykkeltvcdt has commented:
Powell's opinion [in Kastigar] has been savagely attacked as unmitigated sophistry by critics within and outside the Court. Certainly his
conclusion that the decision was at once consistent with the conceptual
bases of the Counselman-Brown and Murphy rules appears to rest on
rather specious logic. Powell, however, correctly observed that in
Counselman and Albertson [v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
382 U.S. 70 (1965)], the Court had invalidated limited use immunity
statutes on the ground that they were not coextensive with the fifth
amendment right. In Brown and Ullman [v. United States, 350 U.S.
422 (1956)] the Court had upheld transactional immunity statutes,
finding that they were sufficient to displace the fifth amendment guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination. In each of these leading
immunity cases, the Court's opinion contained dicta which suggested
the view that transactional immunity was essential to justify compelled
testimony . . . . Thus while the "conceptual basis" of the leading

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1981

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 27: p 123

derivative use immunity is coextensive with the privilege is somewhat

summarily stated, 67 supported fundamentally by the observation that
derivative use immunity leaves a witness in substantially the same position as he would have occupied had he claimed the privilege. 68 It is
suggested that implicit in the language and reasoning of the Kastigar
'Court is the notion that derivative-use immunity affords precisely the
same protection as the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and provides the minimum constitutional standard for immunity
statutes. 69
The above-stated conclusion is buttressed by the Court's decision
in Murphy. 70 In that case, the fifth amendment itself was found to
function as an exclusionary rule. 71 The Murphy Court held that the
fifth amendment prohibits derivative use of state immunized testimony
in subsequent federal prosecutions. 72 An explicit recognition that the
fifth amendment's demand is satisfied by derivative use immunity, argu73
ably lacking in Kastigar, is offered in Murphy.
federal immunity cases appeared to be that transactional immunity
was essential to displace the guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination, the Court had never specifically issued a ruling to this effect.
Id.
67. See 406 U.S. at 453. Because immunity from derivative use is "coextensive" with the privilege, Title II was held to be constitutional. Id. But
just why the fifth amendment's scope could be identified with derivative use

immunity is not precisely articulated by the Kastigar Court. See id.
68. See id. at 462; The Court concluded its opinion with the observation
that Title II "leaves the witness and the prosecutorial authorities in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed the Fifth Amendment
privilege. The immunity therefore is coextensive with the privilege and suffices
to supplant it." Id. This language is not illuminating of the Court's view
of the nature and scope of the fifth amendment privilege. It says no more
than that the operation of either derivative use immunity or the fifth amendnient privilege produces the same result. See id.
69. See notes 65-68 and accompanying text supra.
70. For a discussion of Murphy, see notes 36-41 and accompanying text
supra.
71. See 378 U.S. at 79. The Murphy Court held "the constitutional rule
to be" that the federal government could not make use of state-immunized
testimony. Id. (emphasis added). Note that the dissenting opinions in Murphy

preferred a "supervisory rule of exclusion" to a constitutional rule. Id. at 81
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See also id. at 92-93 (White, J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 79.
73. See id. The constitutional exclusionary rule recognized in Murphy

finds support in Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954). In Adams, an individual who had been summoned to testify before a United States Senate committee was found by a lower court to be susceptible to prosecution because he
had testified without immunity and without invoking the fifth amendment
privilege. Id. at 180. The Supreme Court found sufficient compulsion in the
summons and stated that "a witness does not need any statute to protect him

from the use of self-incriminating testimony he is compelled to give over his
objection. The Fifth Amendment takes care of that without a statute." Id.
at 181.
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B. The Kastigar Analysis and the Identification of Derivative Use
Whenever an immunized witness is subsequently prosecuted for
conduct related to his immunized testimony, 74 the government bears

the heavy burden of proving a wholly independent source for its evidence. 75 Under Kastigar, once the witness makes a showing of a nexus
between his immunized testimony and the subject matter of the subsequent prosecution,76 the government must come forward with affirmative proof that there is no link between that testimony and the
subsequent prosecution. 77 According to the Kastigar Court, the constitutional adequacy of derivative use immunity depends on the complete proscription of any use of the compelled testimony; 78 an individual could not be constitutionally compelled to testify if his testimony
79
were to be used to incriminate him.
The scope of the fifth amendment privilege, and its relation to
future criminality, are not controlling in a Kastigar analysis.8 0 Controversies concerning the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination involve either an individual who has been held in contempt for
refusal to testify, or an individual whose immune testimony is alleged
to have been used against him.8 1 It is in the former situation that the
74. The subjective motivation of a witness against whom the defendant
previously testified may provide a nexus between immunized testimony and
subsequent prosecution. See United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511 (2d Cir.
1976). In Quatermain, then, Fairorth's testimony may have provided a
colorable link between Quatermain's immunized testimony and the subsequent
prosecution.
75. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 460. For a discussion of
Kastigar, see notes 42-51 and accompanying text supra.
76. See 406 U.S. at 460. Note that where a defendant's allegations of
derivative use have no foundation in law and fact, a motion to exclude testimony or to dismiss the indictment will be dismissed by the district court. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 47 (motions must have bases in fact and law).
77. See 406 U.S. at 460. For a discussion of the government's burden of
disproving derivative use, see notes 48-55 supra.
78. See United States v. Moss, 562 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 914 (1978). The Moss court stated: "The constitutional validity of
use immunity as distinguished from transactional immunity depends upon a
fair adherence to the integrity of the process." 562 F.2d at 164. Note that
the Kastigar Court justified its finding that derivative use immunity is constitutional by broadly proscribing any subsequent incriminating use of immunized
testimony. 406 U.S. at 460. For a discussion of the notion of derivative use
immunity as the minimum protection sufficient to displace the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, see notes 72-73 and accompanying text
supra.
79. See 406 U.S. at 453. A grant of immunity must afford protection
coterminous with the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
80. See notes 81-85 and accompanying text infra. It is submitted that
Kastigar is authority for the proposition that whenever a previously immunized
witness is prosecuted for a matter relating to his immunized testimony, the
court's analysis must focus on the existence, if any, of derivative use.
81. See Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971). Where a witness refuses to testify despite a grant of immunity, the issue before the court is
whether the statutory grant of immunity is coextensive with the scope of the,
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scope of the privilege controls-that is, any refusal to testify is justifiable
only by a substantial risk of self-incrimination.8 2 In the latter situation,
however, where an individual claims that impermissible derivative use
of his testimony has been made, the court's inquiry should focus on
derivative use.8 3 Whether or not the individual could have originally
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 556 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Where an individual given immunity is objecting to a subsequent
prosecution, the issue before the court is whether the prosecution, given the
substance of the compelled testimony, has violated the immunity statute. Id.
at 557 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This two faceted approach to fifth amendment self-incrimination analysis can be compared to the dual aspects of the
fifth amendment privilege identified in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
The Brown Court stated:
The clause of the Constitution in question is obviously susceptible
of two interpretations. If it be construed literally, . . . the practical
result would be, that no one could be compelled to testify to a material fact in a criminal case, unless he chose to do so or unless it was
entirely clear that the privilege was not set up in good faith. If, upon
the other hand, the object of the provision is to secure the witness
against a criminal prosecution, . . . a statute absolutely securing to
him such immunity from prosecution would satisfy the demands of
the clause in question.
Id. at 595 (citations omitted). It is submitted that this reasoning in Brown
supports the theory that while the constitutionality of an immunity statute is
decided by an inquiry into the scope of the fifth amendment privilege, the
interposition of a constitutionally competent statute will restrict subsequent
inquiry to the terms of the statute.
82. See United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980), citing Brown v.
Walker, 161 U.S. at 605-06; see also Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 147
(1949). Note that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
an exception to the basic duty to testify. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
Generally the privilege cannot be invoked when the risk of incrimination is
based on crimes not yet committed. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39 (1968). The Marchetti Court stated:
The central standard for the privilege's application has been
whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and "real," and not
mere trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination . . . . [A]lthough prospective acts will doubtless ordinarily involve only speculative and insubstantial risks of incrimination, this will scarcely always
prove true . . . . We conclude that it is not mere time to which
the law must look, but the substantiality of the risks of incrimination.
Id. at 53-54 (citations omitted).
83. See Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971). For a discussion of
Piccirillo, see notes 46 & 81 supra. See also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
at 461. The Kastigar Court noted:
The privilege assures that a citizen is not compelled to incriminate
himself by his own testimony. It usually operates to allow a citizen to
remain silent when asked a question requiring an incriminatory
answer. This statute [§ 6002], which operates after a witness has given
incriminatory testimony, affords the same protection by assuring that
the compelled testimony can in no way lead to the infliction of criminal penalties.
Id. While the Kastigar Court did not explicitly proscribe the application of a
scope of the privilege analysis to alleged derivative use controversies, the Court's
emphasis on absolute proscription of derivative use cannot be gainsaid. See id.
at 461-62. Cf. United States v. Smith, 206 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1953) (defendant
prosecuted for tax evasion alleged improper derivative use of his previously
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invoked the privilege not to testify is a moot question for, once the
government has been permitted to compel testimony, it is submitted that
the demands of the Constitution are different. 84 The Constitution then
85
rules out any incriminating derivative use of the compelled testimony.
It is submitted that central to the controversy in Quatermain is
,the scope of derivative use immunity. 86 However, the Third Circuit
did not discuss the scope of derivative use, but instead focused its
analysis in Quatermain on the protection afforded an immunized witness
by a grant of derivative-use immunity from future prosecution for
crimes not yet committed.87 The Quatermain court appears to require
that the defendant show that 1) the subsequent prosecution related to
his prior immune testimony, and 2) when immunity was originally
granted, his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination could
have been asserted based on the criminality alleged in the subsequent
prpsecution8s Because Quatermain could not meet the second requirement, the court did not consider the issue of derivative use, holding that
.Quatermain's immunity did not protect him in the subsequent proseimmunized testimony at an investigatory hearing before the Office of Price
Administration). The Third Circuit reasoned in Smith that a "witness becomes
immune only if he could have properly refused to testify because his answers
would tend to incriminate him." Id. at 908. The court continued: "We fail
to see how any answer could tend to incriminate when the crime presently
involved was not committed or perhaps even contemplated when the answer
was given." Id. But see Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (discussed at note 82 supra). The Marchetti Court pointed out that where an
individual claims that unlawful derivative-use has been made of his immunized
testimony, and where the challenged use pertains to a prosecution for a crime
which postdates the grant of immunity, "the uestion is not whether petitioner
holds a 'right' to violate state law, but whether, having done so, he may be
compelled to give evidence against himself. The constitutional privilege was
intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent and foresighted." Id. at 51. But cf. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980).
84. See note 83 supra.
85. See 406 U.S. at 461-62.
86. See 613 F.2d at 41. The district court had found impermissible derivative-use of the immunized testimony, relying on United States v. Kurzer,
534 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1976). 467 F. Supp. 782, 788-89 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The
Third Circuit did not directly address the issue of derivative use. See 613 F.2d
at 41.
. 87. See 613 F.2d at 41. The Quatermain court found the protection
of
the defendant's immunity to be limited by the scope of the underlying fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. For purposes of analysis
concerning the meaning of derivative use, the Quatermain controversy will be
assumed to be based on a grant of derivative use immunity. Note, however,
that the Third Circuit, in deciding Quatermaih, did not articulate the source
of the defendant's immunity. See id. The court appears to have relied solely
on cases construing § 6002 despite the fact that the controversy concerned an
informal immunity agreement; § 6002, however, was not directly discussed in
the court's opinion. See id. at 41-43.
88. See 613 F.2d at 41. The court maintained that if "Quartermain could
not have invoked the privilege when he testified against Fairorth on the ground
that Fairorth might testify against him concerning crimes that might be committed in the future, then the immunity granted here does not preclude use
of Fairorth's testimony against Quatermain." Id.
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cution s9 Since the court did not directly consider the issue of whether
there had been derivative use of Quatermain's immunized testimony,
the government was permitted to prosecute an immunized witness 9°
for conduct admittedly connected to his immune testimony,0 1 without
satisfying the burden imposed by Kastigar of proving a wholly inde-pendent source of evidence. 92 The justification for treating derivative
use immunity as constitutionally adequate is the heavy burden imposed
on the government to disprove derivative use; 93 thus, it is'
suggested
that the lessening of the government's burden of proof in Quatermain
directly undermines the constitutionality of derivative use immunity.
C. The Nature of Informal Immunity

A third problematic issue in the area of witness immunity law evidenced by the Quatermain decision is the judicial treatment of informal,
or non-statutory, immunity. Section 6002 immunity must be approved
by the office of the United States Attorney General and is court
ordered. 4 Quatermain did not have section 6002 immunity; his immunity took the form of a letter from the United States Attorney's
office, the language of which was essentially a promise not to prosecute. 9s
The Quatermain court, to some extent, analyzed the immunity controversy according to section 6002 96-an approach supported by prior
97
cases.
89. See id.

90. See id. at 43. The Third Circuit reversed the lower court's pretrial
order excluding Fairorth's testimony and indicated that the government should
revive the indictment against Quatermain. Id.
91. See id. at 39. The government conceded that Quatermain's immunized
testimony served to motivate Fairorth's testimony. Id. For a discussion of
motivation as non-evidentiary derivative use, see notes 54-55 and accompanying
text supra.
92. See 406 U.S. at 461.
93. See id. at 461-62.

94. See 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1976).

The United States attorney requests the

court to issue an order granting § 6002 immunity. Id. For a discussion of the
role of the United States attorney and the courts in granting § 6002 immunity,
see note 44 supra.
95. See 613 F.2d at 44 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert observed:
"Stripped to its essence, this case is an odd mix of civil contract and estoppel
law thrust into the context of a criminal prosecution. . . . I view the bargain
between the government and Quatermain as an agreement not to prosecute,
not as one conferring immunity." Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
Cf. United States v. Pellon, 475 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (informal immunity is an agreement not to prosecute). The Pellon court noted that "courts
have recognized that a promise not to prosecute, in return for cooperation,
and testimony, is not the equivalent of the broad immunity required constitutionally to compel a person to testify over a claim of privilege." Id. at 480,
citing United States v. Jenkins, 470 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 4-1
l
U.S. 920 (1973); Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
96. 613 F.2d at 39-42. For a discussion of the majority opinion's lack of
clarity as to the role of § 6002 in the Quatermain controversy, see notes 62 &
87 supra.
97. See United States v. Kurzer, 534 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1976), supra note 54.
The Kurzer court found that formal and informal immunity are judged ac-
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The dissent in "Quatermain clearly favored a contractual analysis
of informal immunity1S According to the dissent, informal immunity
is made possible not by section 6002, but by the broad discretionary
The dissent took' the
power vested in the United States Attorney. 9
position that informal immunity is essentially an agreement not to
prosecute; 100 where the terms of the agreement are ambiguous or where
the witness is not represented by counsel, the agreement should be
0
construed strictly against the government.' '
It is suggested that informal immunity is fundamentally different
from section 6002 immunity and should be treated differently by the
courts. Informal immunity is made possible because the United States
2
Attorney has broad discretion in choosing whom to prosecute.'O Formal
immunity is made possible by statutes designed to supplant the fifth
1
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 03
cording to § 6002. See 534 F.2d at 515. See also United States v. Pellon, 475
F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The Pellon court stated that if an informal
agreement explicitly promised use immunity, § 6002 analysis would control.
Id. at 480. The court found that generally "a promise not to prosecute" is
not the equivalent of statutory immunity. Id. But cf. United States v. Wright,
588 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1978) (prosecutor's refusal to immunize defense witness is
not a violation of due process, absent a showing of prejudice; informal immunity is governed by § 6002). The Wright court stated: "Letter immunity
[informal immunity] consists of a promise by the particular United States attorney not to prosecute the witness for his participation in the transaction
about which he testifies. The government now contends that this promise
would have been enforceable against United States attorneys in other districts
as well." Id. at 36 n.5. In Wright, the contractual aspects of informal immunity were emphasized. Id.
98. See 613 F.2d at 44 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
99. See id. at 45 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
100. See id. at 44 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
101. See id. at 47 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); cf. Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257 (1971) (prosecutor may be held to specific performance of a plea bargain agreement). In Santobello, the defendant pled guilty to gambling charges
pursuant to a plea bargaining arrangement whereby an assistant district attorney agreed to make no sentencing recommendations to the court. Id. at 258.
At sentencing, a district attorney newly appointed to the case recommended the
maximum sentence. Id. The Supreme Court observed that the "disposition of
criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged." Id. at
260. The Court concluded that the "circumstances will vary, but a constant factor [in the process of criminal justice] is that when a plea rests in any significant
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to
be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled."
Id. at 262.
102. See 613 F.2d at 45 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). judge Aldisert noted
that the "authority to enter these agreements stems not from a specific federal
immunity statute but from the power vested in the United States attorneys giving them extensive discretionary authority to prosecute or not to prosecute a
given case." Id.
103. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976). For a discussion of Title II, see
notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the constitutionality of § 6002, see Kastigar v. United States, 401 U.S. at 459-62. For a dis'cussion of Kastigar, see notes 45-49 and accompanying text supra. Note that
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Informal immunity may be preferable in some instances. to formal,
statutory immunity because it is more flexible. It can import aspects
of transactional immunity; 104 it can condition immunity not only on
truthful testimony, 105 but also on the witness's continued willingness to
testify.10 6 Informal immunity can also apply to out of court testimony,
107
such as informal discussions with the United States Attorney.
informal immunity agreements need not supplant the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination; the fifth amendment privilege does not apply where
testimony is voluntary rather than compelled. For a discussion of informal
immunity and compulsion, see note 106 infra.
104. See 613 F.2d at 40. In Quatermain, the government characterized
the immunity as transactional in part, construing the immunity to prohibit
derivative use of Quatermain's testimony but only as regards prosecution for
transactions, matters, or occurrences relating to the manufacture of methamphetamine. Id. Informal immunity agreements may be general or specific.
Id. at 46-47 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The courts encourage specificity of terms.
See id. See also United States v. Pellon, 475 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
The Pellon court noted that "while one would expect better draftsmanship in
important prosecutorial agreements, and more prosecutorial prudence before
'striking a bargain with the devil,' the shortcomings of the prosecutors do not
warrant letting the wrongdoers go free." Id. at 481.
105. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976). The statute protects only truthful testimony; its prohibition against derivative use of immunized testimony does not
apply in a "prosecution for perjury, giving a.false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order." Id.
106. See 613 F.2d at 44 n.1 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Note that the informal immunity received by Quatermain required truthful testimony and
cooperation "in any court proceeding relating to these matters." Id. Informal
immunity, viewed as a contract, could conceivably condition immunity on the
witness's performance of every condition of the agreement. But cf. Cooper v.
United States, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979) (substantive and remedial contract
law principles govern the practice of plea bargaining). The Cooper court
found the "constitutional right to 'fairness' to be wider in scope than that
defined by the law of contract." Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added). The court
further observed that while contract principles apply to plea bargaining, more
than contract rights may be necessary to protect defendants in some cases. Id.
at 17. Note that, on its face, an informal immunity agreement is voluntary;
it does not involve compulsion. However, with an adequate showing of compulsion, a defendant can assert his fifth amendment privilege to prevent any
use of his testimony, since the fifth amendment itself operates as an exclusionary rule. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 79. The presence or
absence of compulsion in informal immunity agreements will be liberally construed. See.Garner v. United States, 501 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1972), rehearing en
banc, 501 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1974) rev'd, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (information in
federal income tax returns is compelled for purposes of the Fifth Amendment).
See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 16 (1866). The Boyd Court noted
that "constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should
be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half
their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right as if it consisted
more in sound than in substance." Id. at 35. But cf. Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391 (1976). Note that waiver of the fifth amendment privilege must
:be knowing and intelligent. See note 21 supra.
107. It should be noted that § 6002 immunity is limited to grand jury,
.legislative, and judicial proceedings. 18 U.S.C. §6002 (1976). See United
States v. Romano, 583 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978) (defense attorney's proffer of defendant's cooperation is outside the immunity scope; immunity does not extend to information informally given to the United States attorney prior to
testimony).
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Risks posed by the use of informal immunity are evidenced by
the Quatermain case. 108 Unlike plea bargain agreements, informal immunity agreements are likely to be negotiated by witnesses without
counsel 109 and their language may be ambiguous."l 0 It is suggested
that controversies arising from informal immunity agreements should
be analyzed first according to the terms of the agreement."' As was
suggested by the Quatermain dissent, the terms of the agreement should
be construed against the prosecutor, especially where the agreement was
negotiated by a witness without counsel. 112 In interpreting the agreement, decisional law construing immunity statutes may be of help in
defining terms like "derivative use," "transaction," and "immunity." "'
108. Note that the district court found Quatermain to have received the
equivalent of § 6002 immunity essentially because the informal immunity was
inadequate. 467 F. Supp. 782, 788 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The district court was most
troubled by the fact that Quatermain had been unrepresented by counsel and
by the fact that the letter granting immunity was ambiguous on its face.

Id.

109. See FED. R. CRIM. P. l1(e)(1), (2). Plea bargaining is generally nego-

tiated by counsel, unless a defendant is acting pro se. Id. The terms of the
plea bargain are discussed in open court and can be rejected by the court.
Id. ll(e)(4). Under §6002, however, the duties of the court are ministerial.
See note 44 supra.

110. See 613 F.2d at 44 n.1 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).

The Quatermain

agreement provided the defendant with "immunity from prosecution for [his]
participation and involvement with Zelman A. Fairorth and others relating to
the manufacture of methamphetamine." Id. This phrase, according to the
government, conferred limited transactional and derivative-use immunity. Id.
at 40. The district court found the phrase to be ambiguous on its face. 467
F. Supp. 782, 788 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
111. See 613 F.2d at 45 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). See also United States v.
Pellon, 475 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The defendants in Pellon, recipients
of informal immunity, were seen by the court as having bargained for and
received "a simple agreement not to prosecute certain known violations in
return for their cooperation." Id. at 480. In refusing to consider the defendants' immunity as controlled by § 6002, the Pellon court noted that to do
so "would elevate every simple nonprosecution agreement to the level of a full
grant of testimonial immunity. Such a conclusion would be unprecedented
and untenable." Id. at 480-81. See also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971). For a discussion of Santobello, see note 101 supra.
112. See 613 F.2d at 46-47 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
"Especially when, as here, the informant is not represented by. counsel, the
burden of proving the limitations of the no-prosecution provisions of the
agreement should be on the government and ambiguities resolved against it,
as they would be against the drafter of any written instrument." Id.
113. See id. at 44 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The dissent maintained that "decisions interpreting [§ 6002], e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972),
while tangentially relevant, are not controlling. Stripped to its essence, this

case is an odd mix of civil contract and estoppel law thrust into the context

of a criminal prosecution." 613 F.2d at 44 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). (emphasis
added). It is suggested that the tangential relevance of § 6002 cases to informal
immunity is important because prosecutors are likely to include terms like "derivative use" and "transaction" in informal immunity agreements. It is subinitted that use of these terms in informal immunity agreements should be as-

sinmed to be in keeping with their common legal meaning as seen in § 6002 cases.
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DEFENSE WITNESS IMMUNITY

Currently a subject of controversy in the federal courts of appeals,
the concept of defense witness immunity concerns the rights of criminal
defendants to demand immunization of those witnesses for the defense
who would otherwise find it necessary to assert their fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.1 4 Judicial opinion regarding defendants' constitutional rights to immunization of defense witnesses is
unsettled, with the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and
Third Circuits recently emerging as prolific sources of caselaw on the
subject." 5 In this section, emphasis will be placed on the recent decisions from these two Circuits and critical analysis will attempt a reconciliation of their seemingly conflicting positions.
Claims for defense witness immunity have been generally rejected
by almost all the circuits," 6 since the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit observed that judicial intrusion
into decisions of witness immunization offends the prosecutorial discretion of the executive branch and violates the principle of separation
of powers."? But congressional enactment of the derivative-use immunity statute,"18 subsequently held constitutional in Kastigar,1 9
114. For a general introduction to the concept of defense witness immunity, see Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MiciH. L. REv. 73
(1974); Note, Separation of Powers and Defense Witness Immunity, 66 GEO.
L.J. 51 (1977); Note, A Re-Examination of Defense Witness Immunity: A New
Use for Kastigar, 10 HARV. J. LEGIS. 74 (1972).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Praetorius, 622 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1980); Government of the
Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Herman,
589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979). These cases
are discussed in detail in the following subsection, entitled "Conflicting Caselaw From the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Third
Circuits." See notes 126-46 and accompanying text infra.
116. See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 772 (2d Cir. 1980). The
United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Second,

Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits generally agree that a defendant
has no constitutional right to defense witness immunity. See id; Earl v. United
States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967). But
cf. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980);

United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.

913 (1979) (due process may require court-ordered statutory immunity or judicially fashioned immunity for defense witness). Smith and Herman are discussed in detail in notes 134-46 and accompanying text infra.
117. See Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 921-2 (1967). The Earl court applied a separation of powers
analysis to defendant's claim for defense witness immunity, finding that the
power to confer immunity was a legislative power delegated by Congress to
the Executive. 361 F.2d at 534. The judiciary was held to be without the
inherent authority to immunize defense witnesses. Id.
118. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976), discussed in detail in Part I supra.
While § 6003(a) applies to "any individual who has been or may be called to
testify," neither the legislative history nor the statute's language provides for
defense witness immunity. See Note, A Re-Examination of Defense Witness
Immunity, supra note 114 at 75 n.8.
119. For a discussion of Kastigar, see Part I supra, at notes 42-49 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the courts' role in defense witness immunity in light of Kastigar, see notes 120 & 121 and accompanying text infra.
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weakened the claim that the judiciary had no role in defense witness
immunization 120 and heightened interest in the concept of defense
21
witness immunity.
The sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right
to "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." 122 Implicit in the due process requirement of the fifth and fourteenth amendments is the right to compel the attendance of witnesses, to offer their
12
testimony and generally to introduce material, exculpatory evidence. 3
120. See United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144, 147 n.9 (3d Cir. 1978).
Prior to Kastigar and the enactment of the derivative use immunity statute,
judicial conferral of defense witness immunity would have been a serious intrusion into prosecutorial discretion, since full transactional immunity was then
the constitutional minimum, and, once judicially immunized, witnesses would
have been immune from any subsequent prosecution. See id. A grant of use
and derivative use immunity does not foreclose subsequent prosecution of the
witness, and therefore arguably protects the Executive's prosecutorial autonomy
as well as the defendant's interest in presenting exculpatory evidence. See id.
See also Note, Right of the Criminal Defendant to the Compelled Testimony
of Witnesses, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 953, 963-66 (1967); Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense Witnesses, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 1266 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Sixth Amendment]. But see

United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp., 507 F.2d 492, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1974).

cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975) (defense witness immunity is not a constitutional entitlement; enactment of use immunity statute does not make defense
witness immunity possible except as authorized by the prosecution).
121. See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d at 772, 774 n.2 (2d Cir. 1980)
(defense witness immunity has been regarded as "plausible" only since passage
of the use immunity statute).
122. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Many courts have read the sixth amendment,
standing alone, to impose no specific, affirmative duty on a prosecutor to grant
defense witness immunity. See note 128 infra. But see Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1967). The Washington Court held violative of the sixth amendment state laws prohibiting a defendant's accomplices from testifying in his
behalf but permitting the prosecution's use of accomplice testimony in its
case-in-chief. Id. at 23. According to the Washington Court, the sixth amendmerint requires that the state make its subpoena power available to defendants
in criminal cases, and also prevents the state from interfering in the defendant's
right to present the testimony of a witness. Id. at 18-19. Commentators have
taken the position that the sixth amendment imposes an obligation on the
government to immunize defense witnesses. See Westen, supra note 114, at
167-68; Note, The Sixth Amendment, supra note 120, at 1268. The courts, however, have emphasized due process analysis in decisions on defense witness immunity. See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979). For
a discussion of Turkish, see notes 126-30 and accompanying text infra. For a
discussion of Herman, see notes 135-42 and accompanying text infra.

123. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).

For a discussion of

Washington, see note 122 supra. The right to introduce exculpatory evidence
is an implied element of due process. 388 U.S. at 19. Note that the sixth
amendment has been expressly incorporated into the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause. See id. at 18-19 (compulsory process); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (confrontation). See also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (the right to present an effective defense inheres in the
due process guarantee of a fair trial); Government of the Virgin Islands v.
Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980) (discussed at notes 143-46 and accompanying
text infra). The Smith court described Chimbers as a recognition "that the
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Whether these constitutional rights entitle a defendant to defense witness immunity is fundamentally a question of due process 124 and, as
such, must be decided in light of the countervailing interests of the
public and prosecution.22
A. Conflicting Caselaw from the United States Courts of Appeal
for the Second and Third Circuits

A recent articulation of the position taken on defense witness
immunity by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
12
Circuit is found in United States v. Turkish.

The Turkish court

first rejected the sixth amendment compulsory process clause as a basis
for asserting a claim to defense witness immunity; 127 the court found
essential task of a criminal trial is to search for truth, and that this search is
not furthered by rules which turn the trial into a mere 'poker game' to be won
by the most skilled tactician." 615 F.2d at 971, quoting Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970).
124. See note 122 supra. The courts generally analyze defense witness immunity in terms of due process. Id. Some commentators have favored strict
sixth amendment analysis. Id.
125. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir.
1980). See notes 145-46 infra. Remedial judicial immunity must be "clearly
limited," and decided in light of countervailing governmental interests. 615
F.2d at 972. But cf. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980)
(when a defense witness for whom immunity is sought is an actual or potential
target of prosecution, the defendant has no right to defense witness immunity).
The court, while admitting the judiciary's constitutional responsibility to maintain the fairness of trials, found the courts "in no position to weigh the public
interest," and concluded that the risks to other prosecutions posed by defense
witness immunity are "matters normally better assessed by prosecutors than

by judges."

See id. at 776.

126. 623 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1980).

The defendant in Turkish, who was

convicted of evading income taxes, filing false returns, and conspiring to defraud the United States, argued unsuccessfully at trial for immunization of 17
prospective defense witnesses. See id. at 770-71.
127. See id. at 773-74. The court stated that "the Sixth Amendment's
Compulsory Process Clause . . . does nor [sic] carry with it the additional
right to displace a proper claim of privilege, including the privilege against
self-incrimination." Id. at 774. See note 128 infra. But cf. United States v.
Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979) (due
process may require court-ordered statutory immunity, or judicially fashioned
immunity, for defense witnesses); United States v. La Duca, 447 F. Supp. 779
(D.N.J.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1978).
Herman is discussed generally at notes 135-42 and accompanying text infra; La
Duca is discussed at note 146 infra. The Herman court found that, while no
general sixth amendment right to defense witness immunity exists, prosecutorial
wrongdoing violative of a defendant's right to compulsory process may be
remedied by a grant of immunity from the government. See 589 F.2d at 11991200. The La Duca court did not expressly recognize that the sixth amendment creates an affirmative prosecutorial duty to immunize defense witnesses.
See 447 F. Supp. at 787. However, the La Duca court took the position that
there are circumstances where considerations of fairness, and therefore due
process, require that the government request use immunity for a defendant's
witness or be barred from prosecuting the defendant. Id. The commentators
are generally in accord with the Herman court's position. See Westen,
supra note 114, at 167-68; Note, The Sixth Amendment, supra note 120, at 1266;
Note, 'The Public Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence': The Defendant's
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nothing in the sixth amendment itself which gives rise to an affirmative
prosecutorial or judicial duty to replace a witness's properly asserted
12
privilege against self-incrimination with a grant of use immunity.
The court then, reserving the possibility that unusual cases could arise,
rejected the due process clause as a general requirement that defense
witness immunity must be ordered to guarantee- the defendant a fair
trial. 12 The Turkish court concluded that claims for defense witness
immunity should be summarily rejected, without an evidentiary hearing, where the witness for whom immunity is sought is a target of
prosecution.'5 0
Less than one month before Turkish was decided, a different panel
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided
United States v. Praetorius.311 While it rejected the defendant's claim
for defense witness immunity, the Praetoriuscourt did so on the ground
that the defendant had not proved the "extraordinary circumstances"
STAN. L. REv. 1211 (1978).
Cf.
Taylor v. United States, 329 F.2d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 1964) (sixth amendment is
the source of the government's affirmative obligation under FED. R. CRIM. P. 17
to pay for the trial expenses and fees of witnesses for indigent defendants).
128. See 623 F.2d at 774. The courts have generally agreed that, absent
special circumstances, the sixth amendment imposes no affirmative duty on
the government to immunize defense witnesses. See United States v. Alessio,
528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); United States v.
Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053 (1974); United
States v. Jenkins, 470 F.2d 1061 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 920
(1973). The sixth amendment's guarantee of compulsory process is generally
read to ensure the defendant of no more than the physical' presence of witnesses. See United States v. La Duca, 447 F. Supp. 779, 787 n.3 (D.N.J.),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1978).
129. 623 F.2d at 777. The Turkish court's due process analysis explored
two premises: 1) that unfairness violative of due process could result when
the government's grants of use immunity to its own witnesses afford it an
advantage over the defendant; and 2) that denial of defense witness immunity
may violate due process by offending the concept of a trial as a search for
truth. See id. at 774-75. The first premise was found "entirely unpersuasive"
in view of the already existing "procedural imbalance in favor of the defendant" in criminal trials. Id. at 774. The second premise was given more
lengthy consideration but was also rejected. See id. at 777. The court found
that the fifth amendment creates no general prosecutorial obligation to grant
immunity, but simply protects defendants from prosecutorial overreaching
and prejudice. See id.
130. See id. at 778. For critical analysis of this aspect of Turkish, see
notes 161-63 and accompanying text infra. The Turkish court did not
elaborate on the proper course to be taken by a trial court faced with a claim
for immunization of a defense witness not a target of prosecution. See 623
F.2d at 778-79.
131. 622 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1979). The Turkish opinion was delivered
by Judge Newman. Judge Mansfield joined the opinion of the court; Judge
Lumbard wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
See 623 F.2d at 770, 779. The case was decided May 27, 1980. Id. at 769.
Praetorius was decided by Judges Meskill, Kelleher, and Holden. See 622
F.2d at 1057. The court's opinion was announced, as modified on denial of
rehearing, May 7, 1980. Id. at 1054.

Constitutional Right to Witness Immunity, 30
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which may compel government immunization of defense witnesses. 132
The Turkish court implicitly rejected the reasoning in Praetorius
when it expressed "fundamental disagreement" with cases employing
the extraordinary
- circumstances standard to grant defense witness
3
immunity.11 3

In the Third Circuit, defense witness immunity is given more
credence.' M . In 1978, in United States v. Herman, the Third Circuit
rejected the defendant's claim for defense witness immunity but recognized two bases for granting such immunity. 18 5 First, the Herman
court noted that, in cases where the government's denial of defense
witness immunity is undertaken with the "deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding process", the court has the remedial
power to require a grant of defense witness immunity as an alternative
132. See 622 F.2d at 1064. Note that the Turkish court described Practorius as a rejection of a claim for defense witness immunity. See 623 F.2d
at 772. Defendants in Praetorius were convicted under an indictment charging conspiracy to violate and violation of narcotics laws, in connection with a
large conspiracy to import heroin from Thailand to the United States. 622
F.2d at 1057. On appeal, one of the defendants assigned as error the trial
court's denial of his claim for defense witness immunity. Id. at 1064. The
witness sought to be immunized was to be used only to attack the credibility

of government witnesses.

Id. The appellate court rejected the defendant's

claim, stating:

An important factor in the determination of the presence of
"extraordinary circumstances" compelling the government to provide
statutory use immunity for a defense witness is the materiality of the
testimony sought from the witness. The issue of witness credibility...
is a collateral matter and does not rise to the kind of "extraordinary
circumstance" which would compel government immunization of a
defense witness.

Id.
133. See 623 F.2d at 777. For an example of "extraordinary circumstances" analysis of claims for defense witness immunity, see United States v.
Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979) (discussed at notes 134-42 and accompanying text infra). The Turkish court,
finding that the judiciary is charged with maintaining constitutional fairness
at trial, preferred an interest analysis, balancing the defendant's interest in
obtaining evidence against the prosecutor's interest in the orderly administration of justice and freedom from interference in prosecutorial discretion.
See 623 F.2d at 777. For critical analysis of this aspect of Turkish, see notes
147-56 and accompanying text infra.
134. See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964
(3d Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Empanelled Feb. 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469 (3d
Cir. 1979); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 913 (1979).
135. See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979). In Herman, two former state court magistrates appealed from judgments of sentence following their conviction for

violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1961 (1970).

589 F.2d at 1194.

Defendant Herman contended that

he was denied a fair trial and deprived of his sixth amendment right to compulsory process when the government declined to immunize defense witnesses.
Id. at 1199. At trial, prosecution witnesses testified against Herman under
grants of immunity.

Id. at 1203.
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to a judgment of acquittal or a dismissal of the indictment. 13 6 Second,
the court found that where a defense witness's testimony is "essential
to an effective defense," the courts have inherent authority to protect
the defendant's compulsory process right by conferring judicial immunity upon the defense witness. 13 7 The first Herman proposition
(Herman I) was supported by prior case law and amounts to a recognition that under certain somewhat extraordinary circumstances, due
process may require that the government grant immunity to defense
witnesses1ss Herman I cases involve some degree of prosecutorial
wrongdoing found violative of due process-distortion of fact finding,
136. See 589 F.2d at 1204. In order for the court to exercise its remedial
authority and order defense witness immunity or dismissal, the defendant
must make a "substantial" showing of unconstitutional abuse, i.e., that the
prosecution exercised its discretion concerning defense witness immunity in
a manner violative of due process. Id. at 1204. Citing the strong tradition
of deference to prosecutorial discretion, and the assumed tendency of prosecutors to exercise that discretion in aid of conviction, the Herman court concluded that the defendant's showing must amount to proof that "the government's decisions were made with the deliberate intention of distorting the
judieial fact finding process." Id. at 1203-04.
137. See id. at 1204. Judicially created immunity has been recognized
in analogous cases. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968)
(defendant's testimony at suppression hearing judicially immunized); In re
Grand Jury Empanelled, Feb. 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1979) (judicial
immunity may protect testimony made in connection with a pretrial assertion
of privilege under the speed or debate clause); United States v. Inmon, 568
F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1977) (judicial immunity may protect defendant's testimony
at a pretrial double jeopardy hearing).
In recognizing an inherent judicial authority to immunize defense witnesses, the Herman court relied on the general judicial power to grant immunity recognized by the Supreme Court in Simmons, as well as on defendant's
due process right to have clearly exculpatory evidence presented to the jury.
See 589 F.2d at 1204 and n.13, citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973) (due process prohibits mechanical application of state rules of evidence
to exclude critical exculpatory testimony in criminal trials). For a critical
analysis of this aspect of Herman, see notes 157-60 and accompanying text
infra.
138. See 589 F.2d at 1203-04. See also Government of the Virgin Islands
v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 968 (3d Cir. 1980) (Herman applied and expanded).
For discussion of Smith, see notes 143-46 and accompanying text infra. Prior
to the court's decision in Herman, a different panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit had decided United States v. Morrison, 535
F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub noa. Boscia v. United States, 429
U.S. 1102 (1977). The Morrison court found that the sixth amendment and
the fourteenth amendment due process clause guarantee to a defendant the
right to subpoena witnesses and have them available to testify freely. 535 F.2d
at 228. The court held that prosecutorial threats and intimidation which
caused the defendant's principal witness to withhold testimony by asserting
her fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination violated the defendant's constitutional rights and was remediable by court-ordered government
immunization of the witness, or by the entry of a judgment of acquittal. Id.
at 229, citing United States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955, 985 n.79 (1974) (Bazelon,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d
531, 534 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921-22 (1967).
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,or.threats toward, or intimidation of, defense witnesses.130

The second
Herman proposition (Herman II) finds no direct support in prior case
law140 and suggests the existence of an inherent judicial power to
grant use immunity.' 41 Herman II cases are marked by a judicial response to protect a defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory
process and his due process right to have clearly exculpatory evidence
142
presented to the jury.
A more recent decision of the Third Circuit clarifies and extends
Herman. In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 143 the court
found that in a Herman I case, the defendant must prove that the
witness to be immunized will provide relevant evidence and that an
unconstitutional prosecutorial abuse of discretion has occurred. 44 The

139. See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964,
969 (3d Cir. 1980) (U.S. attorney, without jurisdiction over a juvenile defense witness, refused to consent to immunization for "strategy" reasons only);
United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom.
Boscia v. United States, 429 U.S. 1102 (1977) (prosecutor intimidated and
threatened defendant's principal witness). Cf. United States v. Praetorius,
622 F.2d 1054, 1064 (2d Cir. 1980) (government refusal to immunize defense
witnesses whose testimony will relate to credibility of other witnesses is not
crucial to defense and not a due process violation); United States v. Herman,
589 F.2d at 1204 (government immunization of its own witnesses, where unrelated to its decision not to immunize defense witnesses, does not violate due
process).
140. See 589 F.2d at 1204. The Herman court stated: "No case has been
called to our attention where judicially fashioned use immunity has been
granted to a witness ...... Id. For analogous cases which recognize a judicial
power to grant immunity, see note 137 supra.
141. See 589 F.2d at 1204. The Herman court simply concluded that
a case might be made that the court has inherent authority" to immunize
defense witnesses. Id. Because this issue had not been raised in the district court, and the parties had not discussed it in their briefs or arguments on appeal, tle court was "reluctant" to address it. Id. The court did
not hold that there is power in the judiciary to grant witness immunity. Id.
142. See id. at 1204. Although not entirely clear, it appears from the
language in Herman that the courts' exercise of inherent judicial authority
to immunize defense witnesses does not require a showing of unconstitutional
abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Id. The Herman court seems to require
only that the defendant prove that the witness's testimony "is essential to an
effective defense." Id. In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615
F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980), these aspects of the Herman decision were expanded
and clarified. See id. at 969-73. For a discussion of Smith, see notes 143-46
and accompanying text infra.
143. 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980). The defense witness to be immunized
in Smith was a juvenile under the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile authorities in the Virgin Islands Attorney General's office. See id. at 967. The
Attorney General agreed to the witness' testifying in federal court under a
grant of use immunity; however, the United States attorney refused to consent. Id.
144. See id. at 969 & n.7. Note that the Herman court did not expressly
require that the defendant prove the relevance of the proposed witness's
testimony. See 589 F.2d at 1203-04.
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Smith court also clearly identified the elements of a Herman II case:
the defense witness to be immunized must be available and capable
of providing clearly exculpatory and essential testimony. 145 In addition, countervailing governmental interests against a grant of judicial
46
immunity must be considered by the court.
B. An Accommodation of Turkish and Smith:

The Best of Both Circuits
If due process analysis of a claim to defense witness immunity
implicates the interests of the defendant, the prosecutor, and the public,
145. See 615 F.2d at 972. The court stated that use of judicial immunity
power must be "clearly limited." Id. "[I]mmunity must be properly sought
in the district court; the defense witness must be available to testify; the
proffered testimony must be clearly exculpatory; the testimony must be essential; and there must be no strong governmental interests which countervail
against a grant of immunity." Id. (footnotes omitted). Judicial immunity is
inappropriate where the proffered testimony is "ambiguous, not clearly exculpatory, cumulative or if it is found to relate only to the credibility of the
government's witnesses." Id. If the defendant satisfies his burden, the government may attempt to rebut the defendant's showing, or to prove such
countervailing governmental and/or public interests as would make defense
witness immunity inappropriate. Id. at 973.
146. See id. at 973. The Smith court recognized that the government
may have "a legitimate interest in prosecuting the very witness whom the
defendant seeks to immunize." Id. However, the court noted that a judicial
grant of use immunity to defense witnesses may be "virtually costless to the
government" if it exercises certain "options," some of which were listed by
the court. See id. Those options include: 1) "sterilizing" the witness's testimony by isolating it from any use in subsequent prosecution; 2) having previously assembled all evidence needed for future prosecution of the witness;
or 3) postponing the defendant's trial and completing the investigation of the
defense witness who is the subject of the immunity application. See id. The
Smith court deemphasized the role of government interests in the court's decisions whether or not to directly immunize defense witnesses, concluding
that "if any of these options are available to the government, then it would
appear to us that the government would have no significant interests which
countervail the defendant's due process rights." See id. Cf. United States
v. La Duca, 447 F. Supp. 779 (D.N.J.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Rocco,
587 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1978) (claims for defense witness immunity must be
raised at trial). The La Duca court emphasized that use immunity, unlike
transactional immunity, does not operate to foreclose future prosecution. 447
F. Supp. at 786. The La Duca court also observed:
Even assuming . . . that the grant of use immunity renders more
difficult future prosecution of an immunized witness who has not yet
been convicted, that may be the price [the government] has to pay
to prosecute the defendant. Where a potential witness, who is also a
potential defendant, has evidence which a court finds could exculpate
another . . . his continued silence could cost the accused everything.
Id. at 788. For a discussion of the government's burden of proof when it
seeks to prosecute an individual who has testified under a grant of statutory
immunity, see Kastigar v. United States, discussed in Part I, notes 42-51 and
accompanying text supra. For critical analysis of the Smith and La Duca
courts' treatments of the issues discussed in this Comment, see notes 147-53
and accompanying text infra.
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then a clear definition of these respective interests is critical to a court's
47
decision.1
Defense witness immunity limits the prosecutor's ability to maintain complete control over the decisions of whether and when to prosecute a witness called by the defendant. 148 In a subsequent prosecution
of an immunized defense witness, the prosecutor must meet the Kastigai
burden of proving a legitimate source of evidence, wholly independent
of the compelled testimony. 149 Where the government has, at the time
of the defendant's trial, assembled its evidence against the defense
witness, it can certify the evidence and obviate any objections to subsequent prosecution. 50 Where the prosecutor is without sufficient
evidence against the witness, the possibility of postponing the defendant's trial in order to conclude investigation of the witness, or the
feasibility of "isolating" or "sterilizing" the witness's testimony, should
be explored.'l ' It is submitted that since a prosecutor need only prove
an independent source of evidence, 52 a prosecutor required to grant
147.
note 125
It is
interests

For a discussion of due process as an interest balancing analysis, see
and accompanying text supra.
submitted that the Turkish court gave short shrift to the defendant's
in defense witness immunity. See 623 F.2d at 774-75. The court

ultimately dismissed defendant's claim as untimely and noted that none of the
witnesses sought to be immunized would provide material, exculpatory evidence. See id. at 777-78. However, the court stated elsewhere in its opinion
that a general exploration of the concept of defense witness immunity was
necessary to its decision. See id. at 772. The only general defense interests
considered were 1) the defendant's interest in equalization of the advantages
given the prosecution and the defense, and 2) the defendant's interest in the
pursuit of truth. Id. at 774-75. Note that the public interest is not decisive
in this analysis as it is simply an amalgam of the defendant's and the prosecutor's interests. The public is interested in the prosecution of criminals.
Id. at 776. The public is equally interested in the preservation of trials as a
search for truth. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d
at 971, citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970).
148. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 973.
149. For discussion of the prosecutor's burden under Kastigar, see notes
48-55 and accompanying text supra.
150. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 973;
Note, supra note 120, at 1274 citing United States v. Bianco, 534 F.2d 501,
509-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 822 (1976). In Bianco, a defendant
appealed from a conviction of federal tax evasion on the ground that unlawful derivative-use had been made of testimony given by him in a state grand
jury proceeding under a grant of immunity. 534 F.2d at 508. The district
court rejected the defendant's claim of unlawful derivative use, after examining the entire government file, in camera. Id. at 509 n.11. The government's
assembling of all its evidence for the court's determination that the evidence
is wholly independent of a defendant's immunized testimony is described as
"certification" in Note, supra note 120, at 1274.
151. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 973.
But cf. notes 53-54 and accompanying text supra (non-evidentiary use of immunized testimony bars subsequent prosecution).
152. See notes 48-55 and accompanying text supra.
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defense witness immunity is left in essentially the same position as he
would occupy had the witness been permitted to exercise his fifth
amendment privilege.15 3
A defendant's due process right to effective presentation of material,
exculpatory evidence defines the defendant's interest in defense witness
immunization.15 4 Additionally, the defendant's due process right to be
free from prosecutorial misconduct and overreaching may be at issue in
some cases. 1 55 It is submitted that on a showing of unconstitutional
prosecutorial misconduct or overreaching, or the existence of essential,
clearly exculpatory evidence in the testimony of a defense witness,
defense witness immunity should be granted in order to protect the
defendant's due process right to have exculpatory evidence presented
56
to the trier of fact.
When a court is presented with a claim for defense witness ir
munity, it cannot ignore the fact that the power to confer immunity is
peculiarly prosecutorial, and any judicial incursion into immunization
raises separation of powers concerns. 57 The courts' constitutional responsibility to ensure the fairness of trials justifies a court order
requesting government immunization of defense witnesses or, in the
153. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 973;
note 146 supra. Where the government's ability to prosecute the defense
witness is not compromised, "[a]ny interest the government would have in
withholding immunity . . . would be purely formal, possibly suspect and
should not, without close scrutiny, impede a judicial. grant of immunity." 615
F.2d at 973 (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d
at 775. The Turkish court stated that "unlike transactional immunity, use
immunity does not improve the legal position of the holder of the privilege;
it leaves his legal rights precisely as they were before he testified." Id.
154. See notes 123-46 and accompanying text supra.
155. See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d at 1203-04 (discussed at notes
134-42 supra).
156. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 970-74.

This conclusion is, to some extent, a rejection of Turkish. See 623 F.2d
at 777. The Turkish court did reserve the possibility that some circumstances could require defense witness immunity to guarantee due process but
in the case at bar the court was faced with an untimely claim for immunization
of a defense witness whose testimony was insignificant. See id. at 777-78. The
Turkish court concluded broadly that the due process clause "does not create
general obligations for prosecutors or courts to obtain evidence protected by
lawful privileges." Id. at 777. In view of the Supreme Court's position as
stated in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (discussed at note 123
supra), and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (discussed at note 122
supra), it is submitted that considerations of due process require defense witness immunization when necessary to facilitate the presentation of essential,

clearly exculpatory evidence or to remedy prosecutorial wrongdoing. See
United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d at 1203-04. To the extent that the court's
opinion in Turkish conflicts with
court has overlooked Chambers and
157. See Earl v. United States,
denied, 388 U.S. 921-22 (1967). See

this conclusion, it is submitted that the
Washington.
361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
note 117 supra.
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alternative, requiring dismissal of the indictment. 15s It is submitted,
however, that direct judicial conferral of immunity as seen in Herman
is unnecessary ' 9 and violative of the principle of separation of
powers.160

Considerations of defense witness immunization, it is suggested,
should be made at the trial level, and where possible, during the pretrial phase of the prosecution.161 Upon the defendant's showing of the
availability of the witness and the essential and clearly exculpatory
158. See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d at 776; Government of the
Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 971. The judiciary has a constitutional
duty to maintain the fairness of trials and has inherent authority to fashion
remedies for unconstitutional restrictions of defendant's access to and presentation of evidence. Id. The Herman court recommended that when a trial
court concludes that due process requires defense witness immunity, it should
request that the prosecution immunize the witness and inform the prosecution that, absent a grant of immunity, the indictment will be dismissed. See
589 F.2d at 1204. Accord, United States v. La Duca, 447 F. Supp. 779, 787
(D.N.J.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1978).
159. See note 125 supra. It is submitted that a request for governmental
immunity, coupled with the express intention to dismiss the indictment in the
absence of compliance with the request, is no less effective a remedy than
direct judicial witness immunization. See id. Furthermore, it is suggested
that, since a prosecutor can drop the charges against the defendant in order
to avoid immunizing a particular witness, dismissal of the indictment can result
absent significant judicial intervention.
160. See Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967) (discussed at note 117 supra). It is submitted
that the "inherent judicial power" to grant immunity discussed in Herman
and recognized in Smith violates the principles of separation of powers. See
id. It is also submitted that the courts improperly relied, in Herman and
Smith, on Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). See United States v.
Turkish, 623 F.2d at 776. Simmons.is authority for limited judicially created
immunity, used to immunize the defendant's own testimony at a suppression
hearing before the court. See 390 U.S. at 394. Since the court's immunization
in Simmons in no way conflicted with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
it is submitted that it was different from and does not justify, judicial immunization of defense witnesses.
161. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 974.
The Smith court charged the trial courts with the responsibility of deciding
defense witness immunity. See id. When necessary, evidentiary hearings
should be held. Id. It is submitted that, in the interests of judicial economy,
and in view of the fact that a claim of defense witness immunity may result
in dismissal or dropping of the charges, the claim should be litigated pretrial,
when possible.
The Turkish court recommended that "trial judges should summarily
reject claims for defense witness immunity whenever the witness for whom
immunity is sought is an actual or potential target of prosecution." See
623 F.2d at 778. It is submitted that this directive removes from the trial
courts consideration of any contested claim for defense witness immunity
since, unless a witness is an "actual or potential target", the prosecution would
have no 'interest in refusing immunity. Id. It is further submitted that this
directive is potentially harmful to the public's and the defendant's interest
in the speedy and efficient administration of criminal justice, and should be
rejected in favor of the Smith court's commission of the issue to litigation at
trial.
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nature of the proferred testimony, the court should then consider the
government's interests. 162 If the prosecutor rebuts the defendant's
proof or convinces the court of substantial countervailing prosecutorial
and/or public interests, no order requesting immunization should
issue. 0 3
V.

CONCLUSION

Grants of immunity, formal and informal, are powerful tools
wielded daily by federal prosecutors. 64 Clarification of the scope of the
fifth amendment privilege as it relates to immunity is essential in order
that federal defendants can intelligently consider offers of immunization. 165 Specific standards should be formulated by the office of the
United States Attorney General governing the handling of defense requests for defense witness immunity. 16 Finally, courts should adopt a
supervisory role in the area of witness immunity, 67 strictly enforcing
informal immunity agreements, 168 and dismissing indictments when the
prosecutor's refusal to immunize defense witnesses amounts to a denial
of due process. 160
Jane Duffy
162. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 972-74.

See also notes 145-46 and accompanying text supra.

163. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d at 973.
164. See United States v. Quatermain, 613 F.2d at 45 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); note 4 supra.
165. See notes 62-73 supra for discussion of the scope of the fifth amend-

ment privilege against self-incrimination. The constitutionality of procuring
testimony through immunization is well settled. See United States v. Kastigar,

406 U.S. at 453; notes 42-49 supra. However, whether derivative use immunity is more than the minimum immunity required to supplant the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination has been questioned, and thus
seems unsettled. See United States v. Quatermain, 613 F.2d at 41; note 62
supra. For critical anlysis of judicial treatment of claims of unlawful derivative use of testimony given pursuant to immunization, see notes 74-93 supra.
166. For the Justice Department's guidelines on informal immunity, see 27
CRIM. L. RFP. (BNA) 3287. See note 44 supra for discussion of the prosecutor's role in witness immunization. For critical treatment of the breadth of
prosecutorial discretion, see Vorenberg, supra note 4. It is submitted that absent the United States Attorney General's adoption of standards for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the area of witness immunity, the courts
will take an active role in immunization of defense witnesses. See United
States v. Herman, 589 F.2d at 1204; note 137 supra. It is suggested that judicial
grants of immunity violate the principles of separation of powers. See note
157 supra.
167. See note 44 supra. Under § 6003, the courts' role in statutory immunity proceedings is ministerial. See note 45 supra. Additionally, it is submitted that direct judicial grants of immunity violate the principles of
separation of powers. See note 157 supra.
168. See United States v. Quatermain, 613 F.2d at 44 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). See also notes 102-13 supra.
169. See notes 157-63 supra.
0 Villanova Law School, class of 1981; Assistant District Attorney Lehigh
County, Pa. Member, Pennsylvania Bar. The views expressed are the author's
own and do not necessarily coincide with the policy of the Lehigh County
District Attorney's Office.
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